With the recent expansion of extractive industries in Latin America, contestations with the affected communities have increased in number and intensity. Therein, the indigenous right to prior consultation and to free, prior and informed consent has played a crucial role. Based on the empirical study of several consultation processes in Bolivia's hydrocarbon sector since 2007 and referring to deliberative theories as well as human rights norms, this article explores the enabling and constraining factors in the democratization of resource governance through these procedures. While the specificities of consultations in plurinational Bolivia are taken into account, the study also draws general conclusions for similar processes in other resource-reliant countries.
Introduction
The global commodity price boom (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) own visions of self-determined development. The explosion of new plural legal norms on prior consultations at international and national levels in the past two decades (see Morris et al. 2009 ) 2 has been closely associated with increasing contestations about this procedure in the juridical and political field all over Latin America (e.g. Fulmer, Snodgrass and Neff 2008; Rodríguez-Garavito 2010; DPLF 2010 DPLF , 2011 .
The citizen participation of local communities in resource governance has been a growing worldwide trend particularly since the 1990s (see Zillman, Lucas and Pring 2002) . In the Latin American region, this trend has been embedded in a general development of enhancing participatory and deliberative forms of democracy (Selee and Peruzzotti 2009) , intertwined with the strengthening of HR in national legislations in the same period. International HR instruments by date only contain specific, legally binding standards for the right to consultation of indigenous peoples. Therefore, the great majority of indigenous and peasant communities affected by resource extraction in Latin America -a region where 15 out of 18 states ratified ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples from 1991 (hereafter ILO C169) -refer to the indigenous right to prior consultation. In some cases this claim has even gone alongside identity shifts of the respective communities. 3 Currently, the reference to their right to prior consultation and to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC, see below) is the single most important tool that local communities possess to legally resist extractive projects in their habitats; to demand a decision-making role in measures that affect them; to reduce possible social and environmental damage; and to improve their bargaining position on compensation payments and benefit-sharing. Prior consultations provide formal arenas in which representatives of the state, local populations and the extractive companies directly meet and discuss issues at stake, allowing "for contacts between radically different conceptions of development, nature, and human flourishing" (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 273) .
Nevertheless, many case studies on prior consultations in Latin America reveal that these procedures have not been carried out at all or were dreadfully deficient, measured by HR standards (see DPLF 2010 DPLF , 2011 . Against this backdrop, I have chosen in this article to analyze the consultations in contemporary Bolivia because there is an exceptionally large number of potentially enabling factors for implementing meaningful consultations and rich empirical data there. Among the assumed enabling factors are a progressive legal framework, a president who self-identifies as indigenous, and a government that emerged with the support of strong indigenous-peasant organizations and that claims to aim to protect Pachamama (mother earth) and to develop a post-neoliberal economic model of vivir bien (good living) 2 Alongside the right to prior consultation in international HR law, the obligation to consult communities affected by planned resource exploration, exploitation or transportation projects was adopted as a standard by international organizations like the World Bank (e.g. its Operational Directive 4.20) and the Inter-American Development Bank, as part of the corporate social responsibility policies of many extractive corporations worldwide and has been included in the national legislations of many resource-exporting states.
3 See Wright and Martí on Peru (2011).
(see Postero 2007; McNeish 2008; Gustafson 2009; Schilling-Vacaflor 2011) . Since Bolivia's Supreme Decree (SD) 29033, which regulates prior consultations in the hydrocarbon sector, was released in 2007 and widely celebrated as an example of "good practice," more than 20 consultations have been carried out, many of them lasting several months and resulting in signed agreements.
In this article I will first present the interrelations between prior consultations, democratization and human rights protection. Thereby, I will link and contrast deliberative theories with human rights norms on meaningful consultations. Subsequently, the article will analyze some recent prior consultation cases from Bolivia in more detail. Referring to deliberative theories and HR norms alike, it will discuss relevant enabling and constraining factors for implementing meaningful consultations. The insights of this article are embedded in the concrete socio-political context of contemporary Bolivia, but I will also draw some general conclusions that are relevant for similar processes in other countries' resource governance.
Democratization and Prior Consultations in Resource-Reliant States
As Sen pointed out, the question of whether citizens have a voice in the construction of their own development is critically important, not only for their empowerment, but also for a country's quality of democracy (Sen 2004: 56) . McNeish makes a direct link between prior consultations and democratization when he defines these participatory procedures as an indispensable step toward "creating democratic agreement on resource governance" (McNeish 2010a: 22) . For resource-reliant states, this link is of particular importance as it implies that deliberative processes in the framework of prior consultations could help block frequent causal relations between resource dependency and the deterioration of democracy (Ross 2001; Basedau 2010; Acosta 2010) .
Previous studies have investigated causal links between resource wealth and de-democratization by focusing on government spending, tax regimes and occupational specialization (ibid.). But, they have fallen short in taking into account the role of citizen participation in resource governance. I argue that purely parliamentarian decisions and those from the executive branch are insufficient when it comes to administrative measures that have profound impacts on specific groups of society -for example, extractive projects in indigenous and peasant territories. This insight found its way into development planning, which has been shown to be more effective when it has incorporated deliberative processes than when it has been based solely on expert opinion (McCormick 2007: 233) . The need for local perspectives is particularly clear in the case of decisions that involve the environment, since the local population is not only the most affected group, but it can also contribute its profound local knowledge.
Deliberations are likely to be accurate decision-making forums particularly for indigenous peoples in Latin America, as their own political norms and procedures -in Bolivia con-stitutionally recognized as "communitarian democracy" -frequently contain time-consuming deliberations and consensus-based decisions, rather than representative and delegative forms of democracy (van Cott 2000: 9, 191 ff.; Albó 2002) .
In this article, prior consultations are conceived of as arenas of deliberations, which on one hand are shaped by the specific democratic regime of the country, and on the other might themselves -when carried out properly -contribute to democratization or de-democratization. In a nutshell, deliberative procedures should exhibit the following characteristics: mediators in the negotiation should be accepted by all parties involved; everybody affected by a decision should ideally have the right to participate (or the selection process should guarantee certain representativeness of the involved actors); deliberators should have equal opportunities to present interests and preferences; the participants should have access to relevant information; the deliberative process should be transparent and scrutinized by the media and by other citizens; arguments should be presented and decisions justified so that they are understood by all participants; and all participants must accept final decisions as binding (Bohman 1996; Habermas 1992; Dryzek 2002; Bobbio 2003) .
Many scholars of deliberative democracy have criticized the idealized conception of fair deliberations (e.g. from Habermas and Rawls) and have instead investigated hurdles that frequently emerge in practice and ways to overcome them (Bohman 1996; Dryzek 2005; Fraser 1990; Deveaux 2003; McCormick 2007; Gutman and Thompson 2004; Gastil and Levine 2005; Fung and Wright 2003; Benhabib 1996) : among them, deliberative inequalities and other challenges that result from the existence of cultural pluralism or social inequalities. Some of their insights on the creation of favorable conditions for carrying out fair deliberations will be picked up in Section 4 of this article, where I will apply them to meaningful consultations.
Human Rights Protection and Prior Consultations
Bohman emphasized the interconnectedness of HR and democracy, stating that "human rights require democracy in order to be exercised, but democracy requires human rights in order to be self-enforcing and non-tyrannical, and thus minimally just" (Bohman 2005: 103) .
In the case of prior consultations, the link between an accurate procedure and substantive improvements is particularly close: prior consultations with indigenous-peasant communities should not only guarantee them control over their lives through political participation, but also contribute to the protection of HR that might be at stake. This is crucial in the case of With these interrelations in mind, we can reason that indigenous peoples' right to prior consultation is of particular importance, as their members still represent the largest margin-alized and impoverished group in the region (Hall and Patrinos 2005) . These procedures could contribute to empower indigenous-peasant communities and to reduce the poverty under which they disproportionally suffer. According to World Bank chief economist Nicholas Stern: "Empowering poor people so that they can participate in economic growth requires […] building institutions that enable them to participate in decisions that shape their lives" (Stern 2003: xvii) . This statement can be supported by interviews with more than 60,000 economically poor persons worldwide, wherein most of them expressed that one of their main priorities was that their voices be heard and that they become able to shape decisions that affect them (see Narayan 2000) .
Nevertheless, the widespread assumption that an accurate consultation would lead to substantive changes like the adaptation of proposed projects to local needs and to adequate agreements on mitigation measures as well as on benefit-sharing has not yet been convincingly tested. The great majority of previous research focused on the procedural dimension of consultations. The following analysis of consultations in Bolivia will present some preliminary results about connections between their procedural and substantive dimensions.
The right to prior consultation is derived from the right to self-determination and is justified by the facts that indigenous groups have generally been historically marginalized and underrepresented in state politics and that they (at least partly) maintain their own institutions, which should be taken into account in participatory processes. One of the core elements of ILO C169 is the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation before any legislative or administrative measure is taken that affects them (Art. 6 and 15 ILO C169). The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) goes beyond ILO C169 as it explicitly recognizes indigenous peoples' right to self-determination and to FPIC. 4 The four countries that in the end voted against it (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.S.), afraid of the indigenous right to veto, indicated the provisions on FPIC as a major reason for their opposition (Barstow and Baker 2008: 423) .
The criteria for defining meaningful consultations contained in international HR instruments largely overlap and, as I will show below, are complementary with those of fair deliberations. The standards of deliberative democracy are formulated in a more abstract and general way in order to fit a great variety of deliberative constellations, while the requirements for prior consultations specifically focus on deliberations with indigenous peoples and communities. The latter point out that meaningful consultations must a) be carried out in good faith, b) be based on a genuine and constant dialogue between the state and the affected communities, 4 Article 32.2 stipulates: "States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources." c) be carried out prior to the planned measure, d) involve legitimate representatives from all local communities affected, e) be carried out in a social, linguistic and culturally adequate way, f) aim to achieve the consent of the consulted communities, and g) recognize established agreements as binding (Morris et al. 2009; DPLF 2010) . Table 1: Comparison of international human rights standards on meaningful prior consultations and standards of deliberative democracy ()
International Human Rights Standards Standards of Deliberative Democracy

General Characteristics of Consultation/ Deliberation
Genuine and constant dialogue between representatives of state institutions and indigenous communities, carried out previously to a planned legislative or administrative measure, in a climate of confidence, mutual respect and good will
Climate of the deliberations should be respectful, without discrimination; mediators in the negotiation should be accepted by all parties involved
Participants
Representative institutions of the indigenous peoples and legitimate representatives of all affected communities participate in the process; consultations must take into account affected groups' own norms and procedures Everybody affected or their legitimate representatives should have the right to participate; deliberators should have equal opportunity to present interests and preferences; all significant interests should be represented
Information/ Transparency
Complete information about the planned project must be submitted to the local communities, including information about the expected environmental and sociocultural risks and impacts
Access to broad information contributes to fair deliberations; the deliberative process should be transparent and scrutinized by media and other citizens; informed public debates also in informal arenas
Cultural, Social and Linguistic Adequacy
Consultation should be adapted to the social and cultural models of the indigenous peoples (e.g. values, conceptions, handling of time, reference systems and modes to conceive the consultation)
Arguments should be presented and decisions justified so that they are understood by all participants
Establishment and Binding Character of Agreements
Consultations must have the sincere objective of achieving a common agreement; consultations should help shape the planned measure; agreements obtained as a result of the consultations are binding
Deliberative processes should reach shared understandings of common good; all participants must accept final decisions as binding; principle of revisability of decisions Source: Author's own elaboration.
Case Studies: Prior Consultations on Hydrocarbon Activities in Bolivia
The dependency of Bolivia's economy on the export of natural resources -particularly gas - 6 Among them, newly created funds for children (Bono Juancito Pinto), for pregnant women and mothers (Bono Juana Azurduy) as well as for elderly persons (Renta Dignidad).
7 Bolivia is the first and, to date, only country worldwide to do so. that legislative or administrative measures affecting them are planned. In this framework, the right to prior, obligatory consultation regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the territory they inhabit, carried out by the state with good will and in a concerted manner, will be respected and guaranteed." procedures were deficient, in the following ways, among others: the corporations had already entered the territory at stake and established contacts with the local population before the consultation officially began; the executive branch or the corporations exercised pressure to get a fast "social license" instead of establishing real deliberations; the corporations and the MHE emphasized the socioeconomic benefits related to the projects while trying to hide expected damage; it was not clear who the representative institutions and persons were, as mistrust toward these organizations was great, or parallel organizations existed; during the consultation procedure negotiations with individual community members were held and local authorities were corrupted; the transmission of complete information about the planned project was absent or the quality of the EIAs was insufficient; many prior consultations were complicated by increasing polarization and conflicts within and between local communities (ibid.).
Beyond this general list of frequent shortcomings and challenges, it is worth it to look at a few of these cases in more detail and to see how they were shaped by specific dynamics, practices, context conditions and other influencing factors.
The Ipati-Aquio Case
In 2007 few of them were women (Rojas 2008) . Originally, 21 objections were made against the planned project during the consultation procedure, all but five of which were accepted by the corporation in charge, who then took corrective actions (see Giné and Villaroel 2011: 46) .
The MHE, the corporation and the consulted participants finally signed an agreement.
A process that at first sight seems like a rather "good practice" example turned out to be highly contested afterwards. Some months after the agreements had been signed, the consultation was declared invalid by the regional and national Guaraní organizations. They argued that indigenous authorities had been "bought" by the corporations: "The project got the green light, but it was under pressure, buying the conscience of the authorities of the indigenous representatives […] the communal authorities have been given good jobs" (ibid.: 46).
Many community members complained that they had not been informed: neither about the consultation nor about the planned exploration of hydrocarbons. Moreover, due to the fact that no specific norms exist that establish adequate procedures for calculating the appropriate compensation and indemnification payments, each community negotiated separately with the corporation, achieving very distinct results. The agreed sums were transferred to the bank accounts of the local indigenous organizations, but due to the lack of investment plans and transparency within the organizations, a great amount of this money disappeared without having been invested in the interests of the communities (ibid.: 53 ff.).
The Lliquimuni Case
The Lliquimuni block is located in a non-traditional hydrocarbon area in the north of La Paz and is of strategic interest for the Bolivian government, as the Bolivian-Venezuelan consortium YPFB PETROANDINA S.A.M. is in charge of the operations, and the Bolivian government argues that the resource extraction from this region will contribute to more regional equality within the country. Among the affected communities are indigenous Mosetén and Leco peoples and settler communities that migrated into this area more recently. As in many other places in Bolivia, social conflicts between these two groups over lands, natural resources and decision- In response, the government started a public campaign in which it tried to delegitimize the CPILAP by stating that it was being instrumentalized by USAID to debilitate the government. In response to this accusation, CPILAP president José Ortiz declared in a press conference: "The CPILAP analyzed the exploration project in the north of La Paz thoroughly, we have been supporting the change process, we are not the opposition. We want to support the change process, any development project in the north of La Paz is welcome, but we want to be consulted" (cited in Costas Monje 2009: 165) . Evidence indicates that the organizational fragmentation in this case was related to the fact that the directly affected communities were not willing to share their compensation payments with other local communities and their regional representatives (ibid.: 163 ff.). Anyhow, a series of social conflicts within and between local communities resulted from the consultation procedure, as did a legitimacy crisis for the CPILAP.
The San Isidro Case
In the San Isidro block (Santa Cruz), the exploration of the Tacobo and Tajibo fields was carried out by Pluspetrol, in cooperation with the public corporation Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). This is a traditional area for hydrocarbon activities; the local Guaraní population already had relevant experience and skills that proved to be crucial in shaping the consultation procedure. In December 2009, the responsible state entities organized meetings with the authorities of the affected communities and, as usual, they started implementing a deficient prior consultation. The underlying EIAs were incomplete and far too general, the local community members were not well-informed, the process was not transparent, the dialogue was not carried out in a socially and culturally adequate form, and the regional or- It contained changes to the intended project, including the translocation of seismic lines in order to protect water resources, the restriction of water use by the corporation to one specific well, and the implementation of more rigorous monitoring programs such as a transparent early-warning system (ibid.: 273-289). With regard to monetary compensation, the APG initially demanded 580,000 USD but finally accepted the offer of 100,000 USD (ibid.: 238), with the fund being administered by the APG.
Enabling and Constraining Factors in Democratizing Resource Governance
The adoption of a legal norm that regulates the consultation procedure in the hydrocarbon by referring to HR standards and those of deliberative democracy (see Table 1 ).
Undoubtedly, the main tension regarding the rights to consultation and to FPIC in Bolivia and elsewhere is whether they guarantee the communities a genuine decision-making role or whether they give them only the opportunity to express their opinions. Therefore, the single But, this understanding is still very vague and there is ample room for interpretation.
Not only have HR scholars and activists reflect upon the decision-making role of civil society in state policies, scholars of deliberative democracy have also done so. For example, Fraser (1990) distinguishes between the opinion-forming and the decision-making role of civil society in her definition of "weak" and "strong" publics. Her conviction is that strong publics with decision-making competencies would further democratization and social equality.
But, governments worldwide -among them the Bolivian one -have tended to prioritize strategic economic interests and so-called "national interests" over livelihood issues and local conceptions of self-determined development, thereby reducing the real decision-making power of affected communities.
In contemporary Bolivia, the general democratic system and current state-society rela- Deveaux 2003; Benhabib 1996; Bohman 1996) -is likely to account better for the existing heterogeneity of local populations, in order to both avoid the exacerbation of power asymmetries and guarantee that minority interests do not go unheard.
The requirement of providing complete information to the affected communities has generally not been fulfilled. The given information often did not contain detailed descriptions of flora and fauna, and it lacked data concerning expected direct and indirect impacts.
Therefore, in many cases it has been up to the communities to press for more specific information and to complement the deficient documents. These information deficits created situations of uncertainty and lack of knowledge within local populations, which contributed to The establishment of agreements was the aim of the consultations, and many of them influenced planned measures. The observations of the community members were often incorporated into the EIAs and some solutions for reducing expected environmental and sociocul-tural impacts have been found. Thus, they have the potential to contribute to HR protection.
In the San Isidro case, the communities even became empowered as a result of the deliberative process. Anyhow, it is questionable whether prior consultations can open windows of opportunity for alternative paths of development and whether counter-hegemonic values and forms of knowledge and argumentation can succeed in these deliberations. Importantly, the entanglement of financial and livelihood issues in consultation procedures is likely to produce adverse effects regarding environmental and HR protection by opening possibilities for questionable tit-for-tat strategies. This can be risky, as sustainable development paths might be played off (by the state as well as by civil society actors) against short-term economic benefits. 13 The lack of clear standards for establishing compensation and indemnification payments also had adverse effects. It led to situations in which the power of local players rather than
the expected damage and impact ended up being decisive for the establishment of the transferred sums. In more general terms, it is worth it to mention Rodríguez-Garavito's (2010: 273, 276 ) argument that in prior consultations a neoliberal logic based on freedom of contract and due process rights is confronted with the logic of HR protection, including indigenous selfdetermination. Putting a monetary price on the loss of livelihood and sociocultural aspects enhances neoliberal approaches and the mercantilization of nature. In addition, indigenous peoples and communities affected by resource extraction are generally more successful when submitting legal claims concerning improper consultation procedures than ones concerning specific substantive problems (e.g. the violation of environmental or social rights). With these phenomena in mind, Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 273) speaks of a displacement effect, meaning "that the emphasis on procedure postpones or mitigates, but does not eliminate, substantive disagreements." It is likely that in the future the discontent concerning substantial interests will increasingly come to the fore of contentious politics.
Conclusions
In the context of the further enhancement of extractive industries in contemporary Latin America, contestations over prior consultations with the affected communities have increased in number and intensity. When done properly, these procedures are said to have the potential to contribute to democratization and HR protection, which are of particular importance in resource-reliant countries. This assumption, though, still lacks empirical foundation. This article aims to contribute to reducing this research gap by analyzing and discussing whether 13 In this context, Barstow and Baker's (2008) finding that the recognition of community-based property rights over lands and natural resources can be helpful for the protection of their livelihoods and culture should be taken into account.
and under which conditions prior consultations democratize resource governance and help to guarantee the HR of affected populations.
I argue that prior consultations are important for democratization as they can give a voice to persons and groups in decisions that have profound impacts on their lives and future development. The right of indigenous peoples to prior consultations and to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) has been enshrined in international HR norms; it is considered a fundamental right, as it represents not only a (procedural) right in itself, but also a measure for protecting other related (substantial) rights. I show that the standards applied by scholars of deliberative democracy and of HR to assess, respectively, just deliberations and meaningful consultations greatly overlap and complement one another. Hence, bringing those academic strands together can help improve consultation procedures as researchers can learn from the knowledge of scholars of deliberative democracy; the empirical data provided by the great variety of deliberative processes in the framework of consultations in Latin America can be valuable for further elaborating deliberative theories, particularly regarding deliberations in contexts characterized by cultural pluralism and social inequality.
This article as well as most previous research on prior consultations falls short in giving meaningful importance to the perspectives of local actors on these processes, a shortfall that should be overcome by further investigations. Hence, I plan to carry out in-depth case studies with ethnographic methods to examine how normative frameworks based on HR doctrine and on deliberative theories interact with local norms and perspectives on accurate decision-making. Simultaneously, by connecting the profound knowledge on specific cases, comparative analyses could help identify their common and unique characteristics and elaborate middle-range theories on meaningful consultations.
Seen through a deliberative theory lens, we find that most enabling factors for implementing meaningful consultations are those that contribute to reducing deliberative inequalities between the state, the corporation and the communities, as well as within local populations. Among those factors are: a progressive and specific legal framework; communities with access to expert knowledge and relevant information (for instance, reliable Environmental Impact Assessments), mobilization capacity and the opportunity to shape public debates; the support of international HR advocates and organizations; and the transparency of the process, including broader public debates and media scrutiny. In the same vein, generally constraining factors were those that further exacerbated deliberative inequalities like the weak horizontal control of governmental power; the cooptation and corruption of certain community members and groups, and the marginalization of others by state and corporation representatives, as well as power asymmetries, inequalities and social conflicts between and within local communities.
Moreover, I argue that it makes sense to complement HR norms on meaningful consultations with standards of deliberative democracy to better understand frequent shortfalls and elaborate possible measures for their improvement. For example, HR norms require only that the state comply with its duty to carry out the consultations, but deliberative theories further require that the mediating institution be impartial. Our analysis of Bolivian consultation cases gave evidence that -due to its lack of impartiality -the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy is not the best entity to run the design and implementation of prior consultations.
Regarding the composition of the consultation participants, HR norms stipulate that the representative institutions must participate in the process, but they fall short in accounting for the heterogeneous groups and interests that generally exist at the local level. Moreover, they do not reflect upon how to deal with power asymmetries within local populations. These misconceptions and the lacking specificity of the procedure tend to contribute to social conflicts, polarization, and the exacerbation of power asymmetries and inequalities of local populations. In the same vein, HR norms establish only that complete information about the planned project must be transmitted to the representative local institutions, but by referring to deliberative theories we can argue that this is not sufficient. Rather, the spread of information within local populations and inclusive, transparent, informed and egalitarian deliberations in public spheres are of crucial importance.
Taking into account the identified enabling and constraining factors could help bring prior consultations closer to being tools of emancipatory transformation. Nevertheless, I believe that in a context of a globalized economic system that is not directly bound by HR norms, combined with governments that tend to declare economic growth the indicator for development and the single most important "national interest," the decision-making role of local communities will continue to be rather limited. Thus, the deliberations at local levels should go hand in hand with broader deliberations about desired paths of development in diverse national and international spheres.
